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Jean Boivin initiated the discussion by addressing several issues raised
by the discussants. Responding to Lucrezia Reichlin’s comments about
conditional versus unconditional convergence, he clarified that the pa-
per does not explore the unconditional convergence that might have
beeninducedbytheEuropeanMonetaryUnion(EMU),oneitherthereal
or the nominal side. The paper documents a reduction in the effect of a
monetary shock and seeks to explain what might have caused this spe-
cific change. Second, he defended using the interest rate to identify the
monetarypolicyshockthatisassumedtohavepervasiveeffectsthrough-
out the economy. He also pointed out that extracting common factors
from multiple series is a way to obtain better estimates of the states.
He cited the strong correlation between the factors and key euro aggre-
gatesasevidencethattheextractedfactorsarecoretothedynamicsofthe
euro area. Finally, he noted that the paper’s approach is to characterize
somedynamicsofinterestwithoutimposingthefullstructureofamodel.
He viewed the model in the second part of the paper as beinga restricted
versionof thefactor‐augmentedvector autoregression (VAR)considered
in the first part of the paper.
Benoît Mojon expressed excitement at the fact that Lucrezia Reichlin
had confirmed the paper’s findings using a different methodology. He
then made a few short comments. First, regarding the price puzzle, he
pointed out that the sample includes the German reunification, which
generated inflationary pressures in Germany, at the same time that the
restofthecountriesinthesamplewereexperiencing lowinflation.When
the monetary policy shock was estimated as a German monetary policy
shock, rather than as a shock to the euro area average interest rate, the
price puzzle was very much attenuated in Germany, reflecting better
identification of the shock. Nonetheless, both shocks generated similar
results on all other dimensions.
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oil prices generates a 1.5% increase in food and energy in the consumer
price index. Given that up to 80% of the price of oil is fixed in European
countries, that magnitude is not surprising. However, he found it inter-
esting that following the oil price shock, the long‐term interest rate in
Italy increased by more than the German interest rate and other rates in
the area. This confirms that in the monetary policy regime pre‐1999,
there was something specific to Spain and Italy in terms of the reaction
of the long‐term interest rates.
Frederic Mishkin sought further clarification on the authors’ point
that the European Central Bank (ECB) was more aggressive in respond-
ing to output and inflation. Marc Giannoni responded that they esti-
mated a policy rule in the euro area assuming that the ECB was setting
rates in response to some measure of output and some measure of infla-
tion expectations. They used information from the extracted factors to
form these expectations, and on the basis of that, they found that
the ECB’s estimated responses to both output and inflation expecta-
tions are very aggressive. Giannoni also clarified that in the pre‐EMU
period, the Bundesbank was assumed to be responding only to shocks
in Germany’s economy.
Ken Rogoff found the results regarding Italy and Spain in relation to
Germany to be very plausible. However, he hypothesized that if one
compared how Korea, Turkey, and Brazil responded to the federal funds
rate over the same period, one would find something very similar.
John Cochrane returned to the issue of conditional versus uncondi-
tional convergence. He pointed out that in typical VARs, monetary pol-
icy shocks account for a small fraction of the variance in the data, which
might explain the finding of conditional convergence but not uncondi-
tional convergence. This divergence is a puzzle, unless money is neu-
tral. He suggested that the way to address the puzzle is not through the
responses to monetary policy shocks, but rather through responses to
other shocks, which he expected would show a lot of convergence. Re-
garding the risk premium, Cochrane noted that the authors take the po-
sition that monetary policy caused the risk premium, which is the
opposite of Atkeson and Kehoe’s view, who argue that monetary policy
simply responds to risk. Since the introduction of the euro eliminated
this risk, monetary policy no longer has to respond to it. Cochrane sug-
gested that Atkeson and Kehoe’s view offers a very different story, but
one that may be just as consistent with the data. He argued that the
direction of causality could not be established without using a separate
measure of the risk premium, such as interest rate differentials. Michael
Discussion 154Woodford responded that while logically possible, this might not be a
plausible interpretation of the data. He reiterated the authors’ finding
that when the Bundesbank increased rates, the Italian interest rates rose
by more than the German rates. He thought that it would be strange to
argue that the Bundesbank decided to tighten exactly when the markets
started requiring a higher premium on the Italian lira.
Woodford also proposed investigating how ECB policy responds to
asymmetric shocks in different parts of the euro area. Such an exercise
would contribute directly to the debate regarding business cycle hetero-
geneity before and after the introduction of the euro. Daron Acemoglu
posed a related question, wondering if it was the case that while the
ECBnowrespondstoeventsthataffectalleurocountries,theBundesbank
responded only to German events, and the other central banks were in a
way shadowing it. Giannoni indicated that they had not looked at what
happens if both countries are modeled to follow the same policy. Instead,
the authors estimated different policy rules followed by the different cen-
tral banks and compared these rules to the rule of the monetary union. In
this way, they found that, for example, Italy was less aggressive than Ger-
many in terms of responding to inflation.
Torben Pedersen suggested performing the analysis for countries that
did not adopt the euro. He was concerned that the results might be af-
fected by the fact that these countries were heading into a monetary
union and sought to keep exchange rates steady leading up to the euro.
Rogoff agreed that the results might reflect something specific about the
transition period, so looking at either a longer or a wider sample would
be useful. Olivier Blanchard also focused on the sample, wondering to
what extent the paper’s results reflected the volatility in 1992, when
several European exchange rates came under significant pressure. He
recommended dummying out that period. Francesco Giavazzi urged
the authors to extend the sample to include years before 1987, since
the European Monetary System was established in 1979. Giannoni
and Mojon pointed out that until 1987, the variance of inflation rates
was very high, particularly in Spain and Italy, and it is unclear how in-
formative this additional data would be for the exercise.
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